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1 
Abstract 
According to many of its traditional critics, the main weakness in Kantian moral-political philosophy resides in 
its impossibility of admitting exceptions. In nuce, all these critical positions have converged, despite their 
reciprocal heterogeneity, in the so called accuse of moral rigorism (unjustly, I would say) directed against 
Kant’s moral and political perspective. As such, basically, I will seek to defend Kant against this type of 
criticism, by showing that any perspective attempting to evaluate Kant’s ethics on the grounds of its capacity or 
incapacity to admit exceptions is apriorily doomed to lack of sense, in its two logical alternatives, i.e. either as 
nonsense (predicating about empty notions), or as tautology (formulating ad hoc definitions and criteria with 
respect to Kant’s system and then claiming that it does not hold with respect to them). Essentially, I will try to 
show that Kantian ethics can organically immunize itself epistemologically against any such so called anti-
rigorist criticism. 
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A very frequent objection to Kant’s moral and political philosophy concerns its alleged 
rigorism. Thus, we are told: Kant’s moral and political philosophy does not allow for any exceptions 
and this would constitute its fundamental flaw. In what sense however? Does it not allow for 
exceptions that, for one reason or another, it should allow for, or does it not concede of admitting 
exceptions when, in fact, doing so? Schiller
2 is a classical exponent of the former alternative, 
Benjamin Constant
3 of the latter (although indirectly). More clearly stated, in the latter case, the point 
of the objection would consist in saying not so much that the Kantian moral-political system does not 
allow for exceptions, but quite the opposite, that it does so, but it fails to admit it; given the case, I am 
quite puzzled by the fact that these two, argumentatively opposed, critical positions joined together in 
this anti-rigorist anti-Kantian alliance. I will not deal here so much with the Schiller type objection, 
i.e. the one linking Kant’s alleged rigorism to his apparent rejection of any possibility for granting 
moral value to the actions which are accompanied by inclinations (feelings), criticism which, though 
frequent, I find rather shallow. 
Kant does not hold, as his romantic critics would have it, that there is an essential and 
irredeemable conflict between reason and affectivity (i.e. that the opposition between the two is 
equivalent to the one between morality and immorality, so that any morally right conduct would 
necessarily lead to unhappiness, while any emotionally gratifying action would be doomed to 
unrighteousness). Kant only says that, when aiming at performing moral actions, we should not seek 
                                                 
1 Assistant Professor, Ph. D., „Nicolae Titulescu” University, Bucharest (email: novmih@yahoo.co.uk). 
2 Namely in his On the Esthetic Education of Man. The point of his criticism of Kant is well summed up in the 
following lines: Gerne dien’ ich den Freunden, doch tue ich es leider mit Neigung,/Und so wurmt es mich oft, daß ich 
nicht tugendhaft bin,/Da ist kein anderer Rat, du musst suchen, sie zu verachten,/Und mit Abscheu alsdann thun, wie 
die Pflicht dir gebeut. (I gladly come to my friends’ aid, although i do it by inclination,/ And so I am often troubled, by 
the thought of not being virtuous,/There is no other way, you must try to oust them,/And indignantly hold to what duty 
commands  – my translation). Sattler, Alexander, Schiller-Briefe über die Ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen, 
Norderstedt, Grin Verlag, 2009, p.56.  
3 Constant, B. (1998), “Des réactions politiques”, in Écrits de jeunesse (1774-1799), L. Omacini and J.-D. 
Candaux – (eds.), Tübingen, Max Niemeyer Verlag. Mihai Novac 1699 
their moral value in the feelings, of any nature, accompanying those actions. He neither says that we 
should not feel if we want to be moral, nor that if feeling, while being moral, we are moral no longer. 
Roughly speaking, according to Kant, we can feel whatever we want to feel as long as we do not 
guide or value our morally aimed actions by those feelings. Why? Basically because morality, as 
Kant sees it, has to be necessary and universal while feelings, no matter how altruistic in intent, are 
always contingent and particular and, quite obviously, we cannot ground something necessary and 
universal on something that is contingent and particular.  
 
Essentially, his point would be that any feeling, however selfless in its aim, is selfish in its 
nature, i.e. by its very nature of being subjectively felt, lacks the kind of universality which is 
required for a moral principle. We would not want to have to do, on the other hand, with a feeling 
which would not be subjectively felt. Correlatively, feelings change, that is good natured feelings do 
not necessarily ensure good natured actions: love, however good natured in its being-felt, can very 
well lead to morally condemnable actions. On the other hand, Kant holds, neither do the real positive 
results of a conduct guarantee its moral character. Why? Because the actual results of an action are 
not in the full control of the agent performing the action. One could very well hurt somebody while 
trying to help, just as one could help him, while trying to hurt him. Just as we should not be 
condemned for doing the wrong thing for the right reasons, we should not be (morally) commended 
for doing the right thing for the wrong reasons. How our intended actions actually turn out depends 
on a multitude of other factors over which we have limited control, or even none whatsoever. But if 
neither the feelings had while performing an action, nor the actual results to which it leads 
afterwards, account for its moral value, than what does? Kant’s answer: the intent behind it, that is, 
knowing of wanting to do the right thing for the right reasons. And which are the right reasons? 
Those reasons which, given the context, could lead any imaginable human being to the same intent. 
Only actions intended through such reasons have moral value. But feelings, as we have seen, do not 
possess this sort of unilateral necessity with respect to the actions they lead to. They are in a state of 
perpetual flux, namely, they are so changing that not only different people feel different things in the 
same context, but the same person can feel different things in the same context and, all the more, the 
same person feeling the same thing in the same context could want to do quite different things. That 
is not necessarily bad, quite the contrary, it accounts for the feelings’ vital value, i.e. for the intimacy, 
spontaneity and authenticity the lack of which would make human existence not just dull, but rather 
improbable. But precisely this vital value which makes feelings worth being had is what makes them 
also unfit for serving as moral principles. When, given a specific context, we intend to act morally in 
a specific way, we should consider strictly those reasons of which we know that would lead any other 
human being, real or imaginary, to the same intent in the same way and, consequently, myself at any 
other time when meeting the given context. Only purely rational reasons are capable of doing that 
and that is because reason is the only trait of the human being which is universally shared in the 
same way. That is what we could call, in Kantian terms, the universalizability of our maxims
4 and 
this notion runs through his entire moral and political philosophical system: 
 
Act only according to that maxim through which you could at the same time will that it should 
become a universal law.
5 
(The Categorical Imperative, the first formulation, Variant i) 
 
Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of 
nature.
 6 
                                                 
4 Approx. reasons for acting in a certain way in specific situations. 
5 Kant, Immanuel, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Cambridge, Cambridge Univbersity Press, 1998 
p. 88. 1700  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Social sciences 
 
(The Categorical Imperative, the first formulation, Variant ii)
  
 
Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person, or in the 
person of another, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.
 7   (The 
Categorical Imperative, the second formulation) 
 
All maxims proceeding from our own law-making ought to harmonize with a possible 
kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature.
8 
(The Categorical Imperative, the third formulation) 
 
Right is…the totality of conditions, under which the will (Willkür) of one person can be 
unified with the will of another under a universal law of freedom.
9 
(The Principle of Right, variant i) 
 
Every action is right which, or the maxim of which, allows the freedom of the will of each to 
subsist together with the freedom of everyone.
10 
(The Principle of Right, variant ii) 
 
Basically and paradoxically, we could say that Kant rejects affectivity while stressing reason 
as moral principle precisely because the former is not empathetic enough
11 for such a position, while 
the latter is. That’s about it with the former, Schiller type anti-rigorist objection to Kant. The basic 
idea is that this type of criticism lacks sense because it accuses Kantian ethics of lacking something 
which it was precisely designed to lack, i.e. exceptions. That is exactly what the entire Kantian moral 
project was about: offering a systematic model of morality provided with necessity and universality, 
i.e. explicitly not admitting exceptions. Exceptions in what sense? In the sense of moral grounds for 
breaking, or at least not observing, the moral principle (whatever that may be). On the other hand, we 
could understand by exceptions, exceptional circumstances under which feelings could provide moral 
value to certain actions. An objection to Kant’s moral philosophy based on such an interpretation of 
the term exception falls again short because of simply being superfluous. Any type of morally 
acceptable action has its corresponding rational maxim, by this not meaning however that it is 
forbidden to also have positive feelings about it. As previously said, according to Kant, we can have 
all kinds of feelings we may like during our moral conduct as long as they are only a non-essential 
companion of our actions and not their determining factor. Moreover, not all actions have moral 
relevance: there are also actions that are neither moral, nor immoral, they simply don’t have anything 
to do with morality and in their respect humans are morally permitted to act by virtue of their 
feelings. In short, there is no necessary incompatibility in Kantian ethics between (rational) morality 
and affectivity and, as such, there is no need for the concept of exception in such an interpretation.  
In short, this type of criticism is doomed to nonsense, basically because it addresses empty 
notions, by this meaning that the conceptual domain relevant to Kantian ethics (i.e. by the very 
definition of the terms) excludes the concept of exception (not so much in the sense of not being 
considered, but in the sense of being considered precisely in such a way that it does not have any 
constitutive consequence or effect on the moral system as such). In a Wittgensteinian formulation we 
                                                                                                                                      
6 Ibidem p.89. 
7 Ibidem p.96. 
8 Ibidem p.104. 
9 Ibidem p. 230. 
10 Ibidem. 
11 I.e. universally empathetic.  Mihai Novac 1701 
might have it that the logical domain defined by the totality of the atomic objects /names (i.e. of the 
basic concepts within Kant’s moral system) and by the sum of all their potential combinations 
excludes the concept of exception. If you will, we could say that accusing Kant’s moral system of not 
admitting exceptions is like objecting to the meaning of the term unmarried on the grounds that it 
doesn’t admit exceptional cases in which unmarried persons could be married. More to the point, that 
is to say: in Kant’s moral philosophy, the concept of exception is referred to in relation to the moral 
law precisely in order to define the latter in such a way as to exclude it.  
Now for the second, Constant type, objection to Kant. As previously stated, this kind of 
criticism has to do not so much with Kantian moral system not admitting exceptions, but rather with 
the fact that it actually admits exceptions while not acknowledging it. Therefore, the accuse here is 
not so much of rigorism but rather of incoherence. I will attempt to show that this approach is also 
doomed to lack of sense as tautology. Basically, that is because, previous remarks being considered, 
any perspective accusing Kantian moral philosophy of not admitting exceptions and wanting to avoid 
the fate of addressing empty notions, must say that on the basis of its own, homemade understanding 
of the notion of exception. But this however is argumentatively both circular and ad hoc: it comes up 
post hoc with its own definition of exception and then accuses Kant of not adhering to it.  
Let’s be more specific. First of all, we could differentiate between two generic understandings 
of the term exception  with respect to the Kantian moral system: what we could call empirical 
exceptions, on the one hand and moral exceptions, on the other.  
In the former case, saying that Kantian moral theory admits empirical exceptions, would 
amount to observing that in actual life nobody fully lives up to the Kantian moral standards: no real 
human being has ever respected to full amount in his actual conduct either the categorical imperative, 
or its political counterpart, the principle of right, quite the contrary, these norms prove far more often 
to be disregarded than observed. The Kantian response to that is quite obvious, having to do with the 
difference between the descriptive and the prescriptive dimension of reason. The main difference 
between the theoretical reason (knowledge) and the practical reason (morals) lies in the fact that 
while the task of the former is to, so to say, represent reality, that of the latter is to normatively mould 
it, more specifically to determine our behavioral reaction to it on the basis of our specific nature 
(reason). Therefore, while the availability of the empirical judgments is, to some degree, affected by 
the measure in which they correspond to the empirical, sensible, reality, that of the practical 
judgments is not. That is because while in the theoretical field of the empirical knowledge reason 
depends in its activity, at least on some degree, on something other than itself (i.e. the matter of the 
phenomenon or the sensible content of our experience), in the practical one it does not. With respect 
to the practical realm reason is, so to say, in itself and must operate as such. Therefore, while what 
we know depends in some measure on what we can know, what we want, i.e. intend, to do does by 
no means depend on what we can do. In final analysis, for Kant, as far as pure reason is concerned, 
we know what we can and do what we must. These are the terms on which Kant established, in a 
more general sense, the (philosophically) famous principle of the preeminence of the practical reason 
with respect to the theoretical one: what we know (more specifically the necessary preconditions of 
knowledge in general
12) supervene on what we must do (intend). That is why Kant specifies in his 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals that he does not aim to provide us with a moral 
anthropology, i.e. a comprehensive description of our moral customs (which are always culturally 
dependent), but with a rational practical moral system, i.e. an apriorily defined set of interlocked 
duties which are universally valid, that is independent of any empirical (i.e. cultural, social, historical, 
psychological or biographical) factors. Hence, it is quite obvious that Kant’s moral philosophy is 
completely impervious to this reading of the notion of exception, namely as empirical exception. 
                                                 
12 The so called Ideas of the theoretical reasons: the existence of an immutable subject of knowledge (the ego 
cogito), of an immanent unity of the entire experience (Nature), of a transcendent unity of the entire experience (God), 
of our transcendental freedom etc..  1702  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Social sciences 
Now for the latter interpretation of the notion of exception, ie. as moral exception. As 
previously noted, these type o exceptions should be prescriptive and not descriptive in nature. In 
other words, this notion corresponds to the idea that one could find certain moral grounds for 
breaking, or at least, failing to observe determinate moral duties resulting from the categorical 
imperative. More specifically, the claim is that, on strictly Kantian grounds, we could come up with 
contexts in which the observance of a certain moral duty stemming from the categorical imperative 
leads to the breach of another moral duty deriving from the same principle. This would be a serious 
threat to the coherence of the Kantian moral system indeed. On the other hand, we must take account 
of the fact that Kant himself considers such situations, his solution being to say that in such cases the 
so called breach is not a breach at all but something completely different. Simply put, for Kant, 
failing to abide by a certain duty for the sake of respecting another is not the same as plainly breaking 
it, but another act altogether, which is morally irreproachable. But how do I decide in such contexts, 
how do I come to know in keeping with which of the two (or potentially more) duties I should direct 
my actions? At this point, at least in my opinion, the Kantian moral thought would prove to be very 
resourceful in offering us solutions. For example, first, we could distinguish between the duty as such 
and its various implementation strategies and in many cases, on thorough analysis, find that the 
apparent inter-duty contradiction is not so much a conflict between two distinct duties but between 
two alternative ways of performing one and the same duty, second, if needed, we could establish a 
hierarchy of duties so that the infringement of the inferior one for the sake of the superior one does 
not come out as morally condemnable. That is precisely the case with what I have earlier called the 
Constant type objection to Kant. More to the point, Benjamin Constant formulates in his previously 
mentioned work
13 a context in which he speaks of a so called right to lie out of love for humans as an 
alleged exception to the perfect duty of veracity (truthfulness). As such, according to Constant’s 
example, suppose that a friend of hours shows up one night at our door asking us to provide him with 
shelter as he is followed by a villain. We accept. Afterwards however, the villain himself shows up 
and asks us if we saw the one he is looking for. What should we do in order for our action to be 
morally sound? Of course, we could do what regularly any normal person would do in such a case 
and claim that we didn’t see him. However, on Kantian terms, this would allegedly constitute a lie 
and consequently represent a breach of the perfect duty of veracity. On the other hand, if we told the 
truth, we would endanger the life of another human being. To this would amount the sort of moral 
ground for breaking a perfect duty I was earlier speaking of and as the Kantian moral system would 
seem to treat this type of conduct as morally unacceptable would mean that there is something flawed 
about it, or at least so the objection goes. Basically, my pro-Kantian response would be that this type 
of untruthfulness does not constitute a lie, i.e. a moral breach of the perfect duty of veracity, but a 
completely different act. There are two interrelated sets of distinctions which Kant makes in this 
respect: (i) the one between mendacium (consciously making false statements after explicitly 
claiming to tell the truth) and falsiloquium (consciously making false statements without explicitly 
claiming to tell the truth), respectively (ii) the one between veracity and open-hearted-ness. With 
regard to the first distinction, it must be said that Kant characterizes only the mendacium as a breach 
of the perfect duty of veracity, i.e. wrong, while treating the falsiloquium as morally indeterminate, 
i.e. neither good, nor wrong (in his terms, only congruous with the duty, but not out of duty
14). 
                                                 
13See note 3. 
14 This is one of the classical distinctions in Kant’s moral philosophy. The basic idea would be that in 
evaluating the moral value of an action, one must take into account not just the deed as such (all the less it’s actual 
results, as it has already been pointed) but its maxim, i.e. it’s reason. The point is that there are some actions that, 
although they do not breach any moral law as such, they have no moral value because the reason behind them is not 
morally valid, i.e. strictly rational. In pseudo-Kantian terms one might characterize them as contingently moral as 
opposed to the genuine moral actions which are necessarily so. The former are contiguous with duty, while the latter are 
out of duty. The most famous example is the one in which one supposedly sees a needy person begging on the street. 
Now, if he/she helps him/her just out of peaty, the former’s action is contiguous with duty (i.e. not unmoral), however it Mihai Novac 1703 
Therefore, in the aforementioned dilemmatic context I could still choose to help my friend and not 
tell the truth by committing falsiloquium and not mendacium (technically speaking most of our real 
life so called lies are falsiloquium and not mendacium). Of course, to be completely honest, there still 
remains a problem because although not an unmoral deed, the falsiloquium is not a moral one as well 
and this would mean that in this situation, on Kantian terms, the act of helping another human being 
(perhaps saving his/her life) has no moral value. However, I do not think that this is an unsolvable 
problem, at least so long as we have sufficient imagination to think in the Kantian spirit and not 
unilaterally in his letter, so to say. 
As for the second distinction, Kant says: All that an honest, but refrained (not open hearted) 
man says, is true indeed, despite of not telling the entire truth. As opposed to him, someone who is 
dishonest says something the falsity of which is known to him. The statement of the latter bears the 
name of lie in the theory of virtue. And be it completely harmless, it is still not inoffensive; in fact it is 
a serious harm brought upon one’s duty to himself, namely to an indispensable one, the breaching of 
which diminishes the human dignity in our own person. 
15 In other words, although the perfect duty 
of veracity compels us to tell the truth, it doesn’t compel us to tell the entire truth. Consequently, in 
the aforementioned context, I would still have the morally legitimate option of being vague and 
imprecise in my affirmations, thus, hopefully, saving my friends’ life.  
Hence, by repeated uses of falsiloquium and this limited open-heartedness I could come up 
with a strategy that is both practically useful (in saving my friends life) and morally permitted 
(though not morally valuable).  
 
Now, in the end, I would like to address a most common objection to Kantian ethics. When 
faced with this kind of moral theory most people react by claiming that nobody would ever react in 
real life in such a way, at least not completely. This is the basis for both the intuitionist and the 
utilitarian criticisms of Kant. Point taken, but this is not what Kant attempts to do, in fact, from his 
perspective, this is not what any moral theory in general should attempt to do, that is provide an 
accurate description of our moral behavior. As previously stated, according to Kant, moral theory 
should be prescriptive with respect to our empirical reality, that is, provide a set of idealized 
standards on the basis of which we can (i) direct our moral actions and (ii) evaluate the moral value 
of our actions. Behind this claim lies the stoic moral assumption of his philosophy that surely doesn’t 
sound quite as extravagant as his other claims, namely the notion that we should be held morally 
accountable only for those aspects of our being (actions, situations in which we partake, attitudes, 
reactions etc.) that are in our complete control. On common sense level we tend to agree more with 
this fact as I’m sure that everyone has at least once in his life found himself in the bitter position of 
having wanted to do the right thing (help someone for example) only to find that by this he made 
matters worse, due to unexpected factors. So as the real world outcome of our actions is always 
determined by a lot of other factors than the ones we can control, what actually matters for the 
evaluation of the moral value of our actions is our intent and not their outcome. As such, if we 
wanted to renounce the ideal-prescriptive character of the Kantian theory in favor of a more down to 
earth (i.e. descriptively accurate) moral conception, we should be ready and able to morally cope 
with the idea of blaming someone for something that wasn’t dependent on him on the first place, we 
would have to, so to say, find it in ourselves to blame Oedipus for his (predetermined) destiny. How 
would a political model built on such moral grounds look like, I dare not imagine, but I’m sure it 
                                                                                                                                      
is no genuine moral action as peaty is a feeling and feelings are not valid moral grounds (considering that the same 
feeling can sometimes lead to morally good actions and sometimes quite the contrary). In this context, only the former’s 
rational respect for the needy as a human being (directly derived from the categorical imperative) is a reason that can 
provide moral value to the action of helping him/her. For further detail you can consult Kant’s Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals.  
15 Kant, Briefwechsel, Vol.II, Müller, München, 1996, p.564 (my translation). 1704  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Social sciences 
would be less democratic than both the utilitarian and the intuitionist critics of Kant would 
appreciate.  
 
 
References 
 
  Constant, B. (1998), “Des réactions politiques”, in Écrits de jeunesse (1774-1799), L. Omacini and J.-D. 
Candaux – (eds.), Tübingen, Max Niemeyer Verlag. 
  Sattler, Alexander, Schiller-Briefe über die Ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen, Norderstedt, Grin Verlag, 
2009.  
  Kant, Briefwechsel, Vol.II, München, Müller, 1996, p.564. 
  Kant, Immanuel, Critica raţiunii practice, Bucureşti, Ed. Iri, 1999. 
  Kant, Immanuel, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Cambridge, Cambridge Univbersity Press, 
1998. 